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PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
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PC 111

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before I take questions I wanted to make a few points about the trip to Africa that I am undertaking, starting on Monday:

First, the American diplomatic effort is being undertaken with the support and with the encouragement of all of the parties involved.

Secondly, there is no "American plan." The solutions have to be found in Africa and have to be found by negotiations among the parties.

Third, the United States has agreed to offer its good offices because no other country was available to perform this role and because the risks to world peace of an escalating violence in southern Africa were very severe.

Fourth, war had already started in southern Africa. The danger of its expansion, the danger of foreign intervention, the impact on the national security

PR #429

2

of the United States and on world peace dictated that we make an effort to find a peaceful solution. The worst that can happen, if this effort fails, is what was certain to happen if the effort is not made.

We are dealing with three problems: Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa -- each having different aspects and each having different time tables.

On this trip we will deal primarily with the issues of Namibia and Rhodesia. It is not a negotiation that will lend itself to dramatic final conclusions, because there are, in the case of Rhodesia, four states, four liberation movements, the Rhodesian settlers in South Africa involved; in the case of Namibia, several African states -- again South Africa -- the national movement recognized by the Organization of African Unity namely, SWAPO, and several internal groups assembled in a constitutional conference.

We are pursuing this policy which will not support violence and which stands opposed to foreign intervention, in the interest of world peace, in the national interest of the United States, and above all for the interests of the peoples of Africa.

Now I will be glad to take questions.

Yes, sir.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think any arrangements you can help to make to resolve the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia can have any lasting relevance and stability in a region where the strongest nation, South Africa, is saying through Prime Minister Vorster that they intend to preserve their system of white rule?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The solutions to Rhodesia and Namibia, if they can be achieved, can have a lasting character.

The purpose is to enable a transition to independence in Namibia and to majority rule and protection of minority rights in Rhodesia under conditions that will enable all the communities to live together and in which the bloodshed is put to an end.

The conditions in South Africa are more complicated and require a much longer time span for their evolution.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you go into some detail on the apparent American-British incentive plan to help

bring about a transition to black rule in Rhodesia?

There has been a lot of speculation about it. I know you have spoken to people on the Hill about it. Could you provide us with some details?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Obviously, any solution in Rhodesia will have to have political components and economic components. It should not be seen as an effort to buy out the white settlers.

Rather, Rhodesia is a rich country that can have a substantial economic rate of progress after full independence is achieved.

What we have been discussing with the United Kingdom and with other interested parties is a scheme that can be used either for investment in Rhodesia to spur economic progress, or as a safety net for those settlers who want to leave -- or for both.

Some of the funds can come from private sources that have economic interests there. Some can come from governments.

The leadership in this effort will have to be taken by the United Kingdom, which has the

legal responsibilities for Rhodesia, with our support. We have talked to other countries, and the Government of France has already announced its support -- so this plan is going to have a wide basis, but its exact features cannot be discussed until it has evolved further. But its basic philosophy is what I have outlined here.

Q Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask two questions based on your statement:

You say that this is not a negotiation which lends itself to final conclusions; therefore, what would you expect to achieve on this, and when might you get a final conclusion?

And then you also said that the worst that can happen if the effort fails, is that what was certain to happen, will happen, if the effort were not made. What is that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the second question: We are facing a situation now in which a so-called "armed struggle" is already taking place in Rhodesia and is beginning in Namibia. The history of these struggles is that they lead to escalating violence, drawing in more and more countries, and have the danger of

foreign intervention and the probability of the radicalization of the whole Continent of Africa, in which moderate governments will find it less and less possible to concentrate on the aspirations of their people, and becoming more and more focused on events in southern Africa.

For this reason, we want to provide a non-violent alternative to this prospect.

Now this prospect is before us. This prospect has a short time limit, and therefore it cannot wait for our own electoral processes and this is what will almost certainly happen if efforts of negotiation fail.

Now I have forgotten your first question.

Q The first question was that in your statement you said: This is not a negotiation that will lend itself to dramatic conclusions --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's right.

Q What do you expect to achieve, and when might you expect a final conclusion?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, we are dealing with about eight parties on the side of black Africa.

In Rhodesia we are dealing with the white settlers; and we are dealing with South Africa. And in Namibia also we are dealing with many different groups.

Therefore, in both cases, an objective is to establish a framework for negotiations in which, then, the details will have to be worked out by the various parties concerned. We cannot supply the details by which transitions to independence are achieved.

What we can do is to bring the parties sufficiently close so that they think a negotiating effort-- they believe in a negotiating effort -- and perhaps establish some of the basic conditions for the negotiations.

Whether this can be achieved in both cases in one trip, I would question; but progress toward these objectives can be made.

Q Mr. Secretary, how important is it to end the guerrilla struggle that is already taking place on Rhodesia's borders, and beginning in Namibia? And will you seek any commitments from the front-line nations to diminish their support of the guerrilla struggle -- if you succeed in creating the conditions for a majority rule in Rhodesia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think everybody agrees that if a peaceful solution can be found, that then there is no purpose in a guerrilla struggle. So the problem is: Can one find conditions in which all parties can agree to this?

But as I pointed out, the United States does not support violent solutions when peaceful alternatives are available.

Bernie?

Q Mr. Secretary, why do you feel that you, yourself, should engage in a shuttle diplomacy? Why cannot this be done through more orthodox diplomatic channels?

While there has been widespread support on the Hill, one Congressman yesterday characterized this mission as "Lone Ranger" diplomacy, and I wonder if you would address yourself to why you feel you, yourself, must be involved.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That Congressman was not very original, it seems to me. He plagiarized a Southern Governor. [Laughter]

We have had three missions in Africa. The British have had two. And a point has clearly been reached where, since the Presidents of so many black African states are involved as well as the leaders of southern Africa that matters cannot be brought beyond this point by the exchanges of notes, by referring documents back for detailed instructions, and that what is needed now is an impetus in which the negotiations can be conducted somewhat more flexibly.

This is true especially in South Africa, as well, where some difficult decisions have to be taken.

So this is what led all of the parties concerned to believe that this was the best way to proceed.

Q Mr. Secretary, there are reports that you will be seeing some black African leaders within South Africa itself.

Now you mentioned earlier that you didn't expect to accomplish anything on the South African question on this particular trip. What would be the purpose of your meeting with black Africans within South Africa?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I expect to meet representatives of all communities in South Africa, and not only of the white community, primarily to inform

myself on conditions there, so that I can form a better judgment of what the right American policy might be.

Q Mr. Secretary, many Americans believe that there is no U.S. interest in southern Africa, and that our national security is not concerned there. You, however have a contrary view, and I wonder if you can elaborate on that a bit more?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, at issue is not only the future of two states in southern Africa, but the potential evolution of all of Africa with its profound impact on Europe and on the Middle East.

It is the fixed American policy that solutions to complicated international issues should not be sought by violence. And conversely, if the principle of violent solutions is established, it will have an impact on other areas of the world.

Secondly, all European countries recognize the interests that they have in a moderate evolution of events in Africa, and this is why we have received public support from the United Kingdom, with which we have been cooperating most closely; from the President of France; and from the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the

Federal Republic of Germany, together with diplomatic support from all our other allies.

Therefore, the consequences of the radicalization of Africa would be serious in many other parts of the world.

We are now at a moment when we can still, with relatively small effort, at least attempt to arrest this.

We have been urged, not only by the states of southern Africa but by all the moderate leaders in Africa, to engage in this enterprise, because they understand what is at stake for the future of their countries. And therefore, we believe that the national interest of the United States is involved.

Success is not guaranteed, but an effort must be made.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you expect the current situation to result possibly in any further currency devaluation such as in the South African rand and the British pound?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think I should be asked economic questions, since there are so many people here who will tell you that I am an argument against universal suffrage on these issues.

I have not even thought about this. I don't expect that it will have any impact on devaluation.

Q Mr. Secretary, what role do you think the West German Federal Republic can play being helpful in this African settlement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As Chancellor Schmidt said at a press conference in Hamburg, the Federal Republic has a historic relationship to some of the population in Namibia. I understand there are about 30,000 people of German origin that live in Namibia, and so the Federal Republic can be helpful, especially helpful in any efforts that may be made there, but it has indicated that it will give its general support to efforts in southern Africa generally.

Q Mr. Secretary, if this matter is so important

to United States national security, why wasn't a great deal more done long ago when the positions were not so fixed, and when it was more possible to make progress in the area?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because the conditions for making progress did not exist previously. Until the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, the conditions did not exist.

Secondly, the United States did not feel that it had a primary responsibility in an area that had been traditionally governed by European countries, and where many European countries had a longer historical interest, and therefore we wanted to give every opportunity to Great Britain, which was engaged in a diplomatic effort with respect to Rhodesia, for this effort to succeed.

It was the combination of a number of factors which made it clear that these methods would not work and that underlined the urgency of the situation.

Q Mr. Secretary, is there any evidence that black Rhodesian unity is possible, and will you meet with any black Rhodesians on this trip?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The meeting in Dar, which was supposed to -- which

brought together the so-called front-line presidents, and the various liberation movements, was more successful in bringing about unity among the front-line presidents than among liberation movements. I would say that at this moment there is little evidence of unity among these movements.

With respect to whether I should meet them or not, I will be guided by the recommendations of the African presidents.

I have taken the position that in order to avoid foreign intervention on the model of Angola, that the United States would not deal directly with the liberation movements, provided no other country would do this.

If any of the presidents think -- or if the presidents think that it would be desirable for me to meet with them, then I would be prepared to do it.

But I must stress that the solution of these problems is primarily an African matter and of the parties concerned. The United States can act as an intermediary. The United States can offer suggestions. The United States cannot bring about unity. The United States cannot by itself bring about moderation, and the final outcome depends

on the wisdom and the capacity to work together of the African parties.

Q How critical is unity among the liberation groups to your current effort?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is not for me to determine how a solution is to be achieved. If the African presidents and the various liberation movements feel that they can negotiate by having individual teams, then it is not for me to decide that they should use another method.

So I would say that the organization of the negotiations on the black African side depends on the African presidents, and it is not going to be prescribed by the United States.

Q To change the subject to another area, does the United States intend to block the admission of Viet-Nam to the United Nations? And, if so, does this have any domestic political implications here or reasons for doing so?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President stated publicly this week that we considered the gesture of releasing the names of twelve missing in action as insufficient. And what we are considering is whether a government that is

PR #429

16

not fulfilling one of its basic obligations under an international agreement would be able to fulfill its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and this is -- we will make our decision when the case actually comes before the Security Council.

Q Mr. President, does -- [Laughter.]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Now you are forcing me to resign.

Q Mr. Secretary, does President Ford feel that there is any political gain in your embarking on this diplomatic shuttle? And, secondly, you are talking about the complexity of this issue. Is it possible for you to complete the beginnings of success in this issue, assuming you make progress, prior to the election, or in the period prior to inauguration? Aren't you against some sort of political deadline?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think first of all, with respect to political benefits, it was accepted wisdom that the trip to Africa in April was not a spectacular success in many of the primary elections that were then taking place.

It was undertaken, and it was supported by the President at the time, because he concluded that we could

not, in the national interests of the United States, delay any longer.

Whether progress is possible before the election, I cannot say. But that progress needs to be made during this year if the situation is not to get dangerously out of control on at least some of the issues, I believe all the students of the subject agree to.

The impact of this negotiation on the election is impossible to determine. It should have no impact whatsoever. I was on the Hill yesterday meeting with 47 Senators, and I found that there was an essentially non-partisan support.

What we are doing in the pursuit of peace in Africa is not a party matter. It is a matter for all the American people, and it will not be handled as a party issue, and I believe it will not be handled as a partisan issue by either side.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you talk about a framework of negotiations, does that mean that you need a commitment from Rhodesia to transfer power to the black majority within two years, and can you get that on this trip? Can you get it without having someone to whom to transfer power?

PR #429

18

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not want to predict what is possible within any particular time-frame.

What we are trying to do on this trip is to move matters forward towards the point where negotiations can start, and where some specific proposals may emerge.

I would not expect that this can be achieved with respect to Rhodesia on one trip.

With respect to Namibia, the issue is whether a framework of participants in possible negotiations can emerge. I am somewhat more hopeful on this. But even that issue involving so many parties, I would not want to predict until I had talked to them.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow up Don Oberdorfer's question, it has been alleged not only that U.S. policy before last April was indifferent to Africa, but that it actively aided the white minority regimes. Particularly as a token of this is the Byrd amendment.

Last April you promised that the Administration would take steps to repeal that amendment. That was almost five months ago. No steps have been made.

Are you going to be able to explain this to the African heads of state?

PR #429

19

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that the African heads of state understand that if a negotiation can be arranged over Rhodesia, the issue of sanctions will then be substantially irrelevant. The issue of sanctions arises only under conditions when there is no progress in the negotiations and no prospect for a transition in the governmental structure.

Therefore, I have found that there is substantial understanding on the part of the black African presidents for the steps we have been taking.

Q Mr. Secretary, during the period that you will be in Africa, Lebanon faces an important date in the transition of power from President Franjiah to President Sarkis -- President-elect Sarkis. And at the same time, there are reports that Syria is making intensive efforts to produce some sort of negotiated solution that will allow Sarkis to take power in normal conditions.

What are your expectations for Lebanon in the next two weeks, and what is your view of the Syrian efforts? Is the United States in favor of them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I had an opportunity yesterday to talk to two Foreign Service Officers who just

PR #429

20

returned from the Christian part of Lebanon and who have had an opportunity to talk to President Sarkis.

Also, I will be taking with me on this trip an expert on the Middle East, so that I can be in close touch with developments in Lebanon.

We favor a negotiated solution on the basis of the formula that was worked out in Damascus earlier this year, and we have generally supported the political efforts based on that formula.

Whether the advent of a new President would lead to a rapid solution is not yet clear.

We support the independence and territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon. We will use our influence in this direction. We have invited President Sarkis to send a representative to the United States for further talks soon after his installation, and we will use our influence in the direction of the unity and integrity of Lebanon.

Q I have a two-part question. One, what is your evaluation of the aftermath of the Panmunjom incident? And, two, there have been conflicting reports about the role of the influence of the Soviet Union and

PR #429

21

China towards Kim Il Sung's role in this case. Will you become a fair judge over this important issue (sic)?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that North Korea realized that the United States and its allies in the Korean peninsula would not tolerate such brutal behavior. They in effect apologized for the incident. As a result of the discussions, the guard posts that they had on our side of the line in the Panmunjom area have been removed, and I believe that conditions have been created in which a repetition of such incidents are relatively less likely.

We have also shown our capacity to reinforce Korea very rapidly, and our determination not to permit any transgressions in Korea.

As for the role of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, we are not familiar with any diplomatic initiatives that they may have taken. We did not ask them to pass any messages. We noticed that their press was not particularly vocal in support of North Korea, and we consider this positive, since it was a brutal act of murder.

PR #429

22

Q Mr. Secretary, will you or the President or any senior member of the Administration be talking with former Defense Secretary Schlesinger when he returns from China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I had an extensive talk with former Secretary Schlesinger before he went to China. I expect to have an extensive talk with him after he returns, and we have had reports of his -- we've had some fragmentary reports of his conversations there, and he's behaved himself with a great sense of responsibility.

Q Mr. Secretary, you're an old hand at being a trouble-shooter in many parts of the world. I'm wondering now, as you're about to leave, how would you rate your own chances of succeeding?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was afraid you meant as I'm about to leave office and I thought 1981 wasn't that imminent.
[Laughter]

This is the most complex negotiation procedurally in which I've been engaged, and the chances of success are very difficult to evaluate, because it depends on so many intangibles and because, there isn't any one interlocutor on each side.

Senator Clark estimated my chances at success

at 1 in 20. I rate my chances higher than that, but I don't want to give an exact percentage.

Q Mr. Secretary, twice this morning you've mentioned that your mission has the support of all the parties concerned in the area. By saying that, do you mean the black liberation movements? Do you have any word from them that they welcome the mission which you are about to undertake?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have made clear that we have not dealt directly with the black liberation movements. So, when I speak of the parties I speak of the states in the area, and the relationship of the liberation movements to this process is being worked out by the so-called front-line presidents. We have not had any direct discussion with the liberation movements.

Q If I can follow that up, you said, as I understood it, that you would not deal with them --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Excuse me. We've had a discussion with SWAPO with respect to Namibia, and I would apply my statement to them.

Q Well, that perhaps is the point I was

PR #429

24

making. Some of these movements, as I understand it, have had relations or have had contacts with other governments in the past. Where you said you would not deal with them as long as other governments did not, I wondered how you took that into account.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, clearly, if outside powers become very active in southern Africa, then the danger of Africa becoming an arena for superpower conflict is very great, and I have said that the United States stands opposed to outside intervention in African affairs.

Up to now we have the impression that in the last months the Rhodesian liberation movements have dealt with the outside world substantially through the various front-line presidents, which is the understanding that I have of the situation. Should that change, then the United States would also have to reexamine its position.

Q Mr. Secretary, back to Rhodesia again on the financial aspects, what was the reaction of the people on the Hill to the dimensions of the plan? And could you be clearer -- is it a case of the United States being asked to spend several hundred million dollars in allocations, or is it a kind of possibility; is it an insurance plan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are talking primarily

of an insurance plan -- nor are we saying that the American part of this insurance plan has to come entirely from governmental sources. There are other sources that may also be available.

So we have not worked out a figure; we have not yet worked out a governmental participation. But we are talking of something that is essentially an insurance plan rather than a direct commitment, and we're talking of a consortium in which the United Kingdom will be the convoking country with our support and which will have the support, we expect, of most industrial democracies.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate being able to present this package to Prime Minister Smith during this trip?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not yet decided whether I will meet with Prime Minister Smith on this trip. This depends on the evolution of the discussions and on our estimate of his basic attitude.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

(Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the Secretary's Press Conference was concluded.)
